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RELIGION AND PROCEDURE
Robert E. Rodes, Jr. *
When I began telling my colleagues at Notre Dame that I had
been invited to prepare a paper on religion and procedure, some of
them said "How interesting," and looked vague. Others, more forth-
right, came straight out and asked what on earth I was going to say.
The reaction is understandable. Since God made everything, there is
nothing that cannot be related to religion if you work at it, but proce-
dure seems to be harder going than most things. It is all very well to
talk about God ruling the world and the state exercising authority on
His behalf. But God does not seem to have any procedure.1 It is
fairly easy, if you go in for analogies of that kind, to think of God as a
lawgiver, even as a judge. But to think of Him as a sheriff or a process
server stretches most people's imaginations farther than they will
comfortably stretch.
But it does not follow that the attempt to relate religion and pro-
cedure is futile. It is the business of human authority to do justice on
behalf of God. If I were talking about substantive law, I would have
to say what I mean by justice; but when I am talking about procedure,
I can use it without defining it, as the framers of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure did.' The point is that when God chooses to do jus-
tice on His own behalf, He has facilities human beings lack. This is
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. This article collects ideas adumbrated in
my works, THE LEGAL ENTERPRISE 6-8, 91-115, 140-44 (1976); and LAW AND LIBERATION
33-35, 98-122, 187-88 (1986).
1. But see Fortescue, J., in R. v. University of Cambridge (Dr. Bentley's case), 1 Str. 557,
567, 93 Eng. Rep. 698, 704: "I remember to have heard it observed by a very learned man...
that even God himself did not pass sentence upon Adam before he was called upon to make his
defence. 'Adam' (says God) 'where art thou? Hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I com-
manded thee that thou shouldest not eat?' And the same question was put to Eve also."
2. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1: "These rules ... shall be construed to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action.": Rule 15(a): "a party may amend his plead-
ing ... by leave of court ... and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." Rule
16(e): "The order following a final pretrial conference shall be modified only to prevent mani-
fest injustice." Rule 16(f): "If a party or party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling order, or if
no appearance is made on behalf of a party at a scheduling or pretrial conference, or if a party
or party's attorney is substantially unprepared to participate in the conference, or if a party or
party's attorney fails to participate in good faith, the judge ... may make such orders with
regard thereto as are just .... Rule 26(c): "The court ... may make any order which justice
requires to protect a party or persons from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
burden or expense .... :" Rule 61: "No error ... is ground for ... disturbing a judgement or
order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial
justice."
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why human beings develop procedures. Procedures are ways of try-
ing to do God's business without being God. It is this source of pro-
cedural rules that determines how they are structured, what can go
wrong with them, and how we should use them.
Shakespeare provides a fairly familiar illustration with Portia's
dictum that
earthy power doth then show likest God's
When mercy seasons justice. . .. '
In fact, though, God does not season justice with mercy. He is en-
tirely just and entirely merciful at the same time. It is not until we
start deploying earthly power that we have to start thinking of trade-
offs. Earthly power will never show exactly like God's, but it will
show more like it if we sacrifice a little justice for a little mercy and
vice versa than if we try to be: as just as we can regardless of mercy, or
as merciful as we can regardless of justice.
Furthermore, earthly power cannot pursue anything with the
singleness of purpose that is possible to God. God is not included in
Lord Acton's observation that power tends to corrupt.a When His
Word goes forth, it does not return to Him void: it does exactly what
He sent it for (Isaiah 55:11). But earthly power, if it is not restrained,
will take off in directions entirely different from the ones in which it is
meant to go. We must limit its capacity to do its work in order to
limit its capacity to go astray.
It is in order to restrain power in this way that we maintain the
whole set of principles and practices that support what we call the
rule of law. These go to assure us that no one will exercise power
except within specified limits, and that anyone's power on the edges of
those limits will be! confronted with other power. Power cannot be
relied on to implement mercy and justice unless it is restrained in this
way; yet a certain amount of mercy and justice have to be sacrificed if
power is to be restrained. The obvious example, is the fourth amend-
ment. To protect against the injustice of unreasonable searches and
seizures, the mercilessness of police brutality, we erect restraints that
expose us to the injustice of aggression with impunity, the merciless-
ness of crime. There are more examples in administrative procedure.
We do not dare turn administrators loose to implement broad policies
of justice and mercy free from obscurantist and hampering restraints.
The policies suffer accordingly. As Justice Cardozo said in the
3. THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, Act IV, scene 1.
4. Letter to Bishop Mandell Creighton, April 5, 1887.
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Schechter case, "A roving commission to inquire into evils and upon
discovery correct them"5 is unacceptable. But a certain number of
evils are bound to go uncorrected because of that inescapable
mistrust.
God is all-wise and all-knowing as well as all-powerful. The facts
He knows and acts on are always the true facts. He is fully informed
although He hears no evidence, and He acts with due deliberation
although He does not deliberate. But in human tribunals facts must
be learned, and as learned they must be discussed and reflected upon
before they can support decision. The process can take so long that
the result is worthless. Even then, the decision can be the wrong one.
The facts as learned may not be true facts, or the discussion and re-
flection may have left important considerations out of account.
So, while we have rules of pleading, evidence, and discovery in
court, and rules of notice and hearing in administrative agencies to
assure due deliberation and formalize the pursuit of truth, we have to
balance them with rules of res judicata, administrative finality, and
the like to keep that deliberation and that pursuit from indefinitely
delaying justice. Then, to keep the latter rules from perpetrating too
gross an injustice, we have to provide them with exceptions such as
the grounds for setting aside a judgment under Federal Rule 60(b). 6
Then, to keep the reopening of judgments from becoming too oppres-
sive, we have a one-year limitation on most of the grounds for invok-
ing 60(b). And the courts have had occasion to create a few
exceptions to the one-year rule.7
In His dealings with individuals, God is fully personal and fully
5. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) (Cardozo, J.,
concurring).
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) reads in part as follows:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evi-
dence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judg-
ment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall
be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one
year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.
7. The classic case of a judgment set aside after the year envisaged in Rule 60(b) is
Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 (1949). The government had brought a proceeding to
denaturalize Klapprott at the same time as they had jailed him on sedition charges and inter-
cepted his letter to the American Civil Liberties Union asking them to defend him. The de-
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objective at the same time. He responds to every person according to
that person's unique situation and inmost being, yet He does not fail
to treat like cases alike. But in the exercise of human authority and
judgment, human encounter and objectivity must be traded off against
one another. As a lot of science fiction shows us, we feel wronged if
our affairs are turned over to a computer instead of a human being.'
On the other hand, we feel equally wronged if a human being deals
with us just as he pleases without being subject to objective criteria or
standards of accountability.9
We try to maintain the necessary balance in our judicial and ad-
ministrative procedures by allocating discretion at different levels,
putting most of the personal encounter at the lowest levels, and in-
creasing the objectivity as we move up. For instance, we generally
require a criminal defendant to be present in court when he is tried,10
but the appellate process shifts from scrutiny of the defendant to scru-
tiny of a paper record. Similarly, at the trial level, we defer to the
opportunity of the trier to see the witnesses live, and we encourage
judge or jury to draw on human intuitions to understand the facts and
deal justly with them. 1  But when the trial is over, we put the whole
matter before an appellate court that scrutinizes not the merits of the
case but the conduct of the trial, and scrutinizes it in the light not of
subjective judgments but of objective principles. Similarly, in an ad-
ministrative agency, our first encounter is with an official of some
kind who has discretion in dealing with our affairs. But his discretion
is limited by guidelines from above, and by supervisory personnel who
will apply those guidelines. In other words, we balance the competing
values of personality and objectivity by using a structure with several
tiers, with more personal encounter at the bottom, and more objectiv-
ity at the top.
fault judgment of denaturalization was set aside on a motion brought when he got out of jail,
after spending six years incarcerated for crimes of which he was never convicted.
8. I am thinking particularly of Woody Allen's Sleeper, in which the main character is
made to confess his sins to a computer as part of a re-education program. See also "Com-
puters" in THE SCIENCE FICTION ENCYCLOPEDIA 133-34 (P. Nicholls ed. 1979).
9. See K. DAvIs, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969).
10. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 43.
11. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a): . due regard shall be paid to the opportunity of the trial
court to judge the credibility of the witness." See also Chesterton's remark on the jury:
Our civilization has decided, and very justly decided, that determining the guilt or
innocence of men is too important to be trusted to trained men. If it wishes for light
upon that awful matter, it asks men who know no more law than I do, but who can
feel the things I felt in the jury box.
I found this quote as an Epigraph in I THE LAW IN LITERATURE (1960); I have not been able
to run down the original source.
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In manifesting Himself to the world, what God does is what He
appears to do. He does not give conflicting messages or express one
thing and accomplish something else. Human authority, by contrast,
must always consider what it is teaching or expressing as well as what
it is accomplishing.12 We have to worry about whether our methods
of weeding out welfare cheaters express contempt for the poor or
whether our protections for persons accused of crime diminish the
seriousness with which crime appears to be taken.
Accordingly, we have many procedural rules that preserve some
of the symbols of what our system stands for, and sometimes preserve
them at the expense of a certain amount of truth, justice, or both. As
Justice Holmes put it in an early wiretap case, "I think it a less evil
that some criminals should escape than that the Government should
play an ignoble part."13 Many of our rules on notice, publicity, ser-
vice of process, opportunity to be heard, suppression of evidence, sub-
poenas, and defaults have no higher purpose than to keep the
government from playing an ignoble part. And many of them achieve
that purpose not only by letting some criminals escape but also by
letting some justice between party and party not be done.
Conversely, some rules allow both citizens and values to be
treated with a certain amount of symbolic disrespect in order that
truth may be more fully developed or the just concerns of parties and
government be better served. The rules of cross-examination are often
of this kind, as are the rules governing administrative investigations,
particularly in the realm of welfare and entitlements. It often be-
comes necessary to adjust the balance with measures such as the dec-
laration system in welfare application procedure (accepting the word
of the applicant subject to later spot checking)1 4 or rape shield legisla-
tion (forbidding the accused to defend himself by a broad gauge at-
tack on the chastity of the victim).15
In all these situations, qualities that are fully realized in God
turn into antinomies when human authority seeks to implement di-
vine judgment. Power on the one hand, justice and mercy on the
12. Note in this connection Professor Lawrence Tribe's distinction between "intrinsic"
and "instrumental" conceptions of due process. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 501-06
(1978). In the one view, procedural safeguards are required by human dignity; in the other,
they make it more likely that an accurate result will be achieved. The two views are, of course,
not incompatible.
13. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
14. CASES ON SOCIAL WELFARE AND THE INDIVIDUAL 382-84 (Levy, Lewis, & Martin
eds. 1971).
15. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 412; IND. CODE 35-37-4-4.
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other, deliberation and despatch, personal encounter and objective
criteria for decision, symbol and reality all have to be traded off
against each other when earthly power seeks to show likest God's.
The multiple procedures; civil, criminal, and administrative, that we
have implanted in our legal system and turned over to our lawyers to
administer are built around these antinomies.
Most of our pathologies of procedure come from throwing one or
another of these antinomies out of balance. The breakdown of law
and order comes from overstressing restraints on power, the police
state from understressing them in order to leave power free to accom-
plish its just and merciful ends. Uninformed and ill-advised decisions,
the rush to judgment, come f'rom taking too seriously the maxim that
justice delayed is justice denied. But bureaucratic bungling, crowded
dockets, and delay that may be tantamount to denial after all come
from insisting on complete :information and moral certainty before
setting the law in motion. Arbitrary and capricious decisions come
from trying to be too personal, mechanical and uncaring decisions
from trying to be too objective. Hypocritical procedures come from
stressing the symbols of justice at the expense of the reality, demean-
ing ones from stressing the reality at the expense of the symbols.
The technical skills of achieving a balanced procedure are no
part of my subject in this paper. They are imparted in first year civil
procedure and criminal law courses, in second or third year adminis-
trative law courses, and in meetings of bar associations and judicial
conferences all ove:r the world. Underlying all of them are skills of
heart and mind that relate more directly to our topic, law and reli-
gion. They teach us to take the theological considerations just dis-
cussed and relate them to our personal practice of our profession.
I have said that we have procedures because we are called to do
God's business without being God. On this understanding, we cannot
make an idol of our procedure. Nor can we dispense with it and seek
to judge as God does. We must keep truth and justice before our eyes,
and yet move with the respect and diffidence that befits one human
being intervening in another human being's affairs.
Idolatry of procedure is endemic in our profession. There is a
traditional question as to the duty of a judge who has personal knowl-
edge of the justice of a poor widow's claim which she cannot prove
because her adversary has intimidated all the witnesses' 6-- or, to put
the same question more poignantly, the duty of a judge who knows a
16. See J. NOONAN, BRIBES 730-31 (1985).
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criminal defendant is being framed. The traditional commentators in-
sist that a judge, qua judge, knows nothing but what is put before him
in the shape of admissible evidence. He must decide the case accord-
ing to what he knows in this way regardless of what he really
knows-that is, regardless of what God knows. Of course, this is not
all black and white. The judge may have a certain amount of personal
knowledge and not know for sure. To disregard the need for admissi-
ble evidence is to go too far. But to disregard manifest truth is
idolatry.
There is idolatry, too, in the eighteenth century (and sometimes
later) attitude toward the rules of pleading. These rules responded at
their inception to serious concerns with the power of medieval judges
to decide cases and the ability of medieval juries to determine facts. II
Even, today, they can be made the basis for a perfectly respectable
system for running lawsuits, as they were in the New Hampshire
courts under the leadership of their great nineteenth century chief jus-
tice, Charles Doe.' But to make them into a vehicle for displaying
the erudition and logical acumen of their practitioners, to make them
avoid, rather than enhance, the development of the merits of the
cases, simply on the fideistic assertion that "We must keep up the
boundaries of actions, otherwise we shall introduce the utmost confu-
sion."' 9 is to make the forms of pleading into idols.
Another kind of idolatry treats legal process as a contest of fo-
rensic skills between lawyers. When I was a little boy, Bruno Richard
Hauptmann was being tried for the kidnap murder of the Lindbergh
baby. I saw a picture in the paper of the two lawyers in the case
shaking hands. The paper had captioned the picture "May the best
man win." When I grew up, I wondered why the editors were so
cheerful about a man's life or death depending on whether the defense
counsel or the district attorney was the better lawyer. But the atti-
tude is not rare. Roscoe Pound has a chapter on it in The Spirit of the
Common Law.20 He attributes it to the mores of the frontier. In that
it turns the process into an end rather than a means, I think it can
properly be called idolatrous.
There is a lot in our criminal procedure today that can also be
17. R. MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
21-22 (1952); C. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 13 (1947).
18. See J.P. REID, CHIEF JUSTICE: THE JUDICIAL WORLD OF CHARLES DOE 93-108
(1967).
19. Scott v. Shepherd, 2 W. BI. 892, 897; 96 Eng. Rep. 528 (Blackstone, J.).
20. R. POUND, THE SPIRIT OF COMMON LAW 112-38 (1921).
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called idolatrous. We keep assuring one another that we maintain all
our procedural complexities either to see that innocent people are not
convicted or to deter police from illegal inroads on citizens' rights.
But these assurances seem more and more hollow as time goes by.
They come more and more to resemble the assertions of our ancestors
that we must keep up the boundaries of actions lest the utmost confu-
sion ensue. The procedures are now so cumbersome that the Supreme
Court has held it only reasonable for a prosecutor to seek an addi-
tional thirty years in prison for a defendant who refuses to waive
them. 21 I believe it: is a form of idolatry to keep them in place.
If adherence to procedures without regard for their God-given
purpose is idolatrous, pursuit of the purpose without regard to proce-
dure is blasphemous. It is to usurp the prerogatives of God. Except
perhaps for the disguised Caliph in the Arabian Nights, no judge has
really ventured to do without procedure entirely; but some have gone
far enough in that direction to raise a question whether they fully
appreciate the difference between God's powers and their own.
Among Anglo-American lawyers, the inquisitorial procedures of the
Star Chamber and the High Commission have perhaps a worse repu-
tation than they deserve in this regard; but both the objections and the
justifications that they elicited will illustrate my point.22 The oppo-
nents and supporters of administrative discretion in our own time
make very similar arguments. On the one side, it is considered intol-
erable that the beneficent purposes of government should be ham-
pered with inherited and inefficient procedural forms. On the other
side, it is suggested that government is not all that beneficent, and it
will become still less so if it its allowed to function without informa-
tion, deliberation and accountability. The more we reflect that our
judges and administrators are not God, the more we will come down
on the side of procedure.
Certain lawyers, identified with the so-called Critical Legal Stud-
ies movement, have proposed "delegitimizing" the tribunals before
which they appear.23 Their claim is that these tribunals and their pro-
cedures confer a spurious legitimacy on the hierarchical structures
they serve. There is a certain. family resemblance between the claim
21. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
22. See G.O. TREVELYAN, ENGLAND UNDER THE STUARTS 168-69 (1904). On the High
Commission, see my LAY AUTHORITY AND REFORMATION IN THE ENGLISH CHURCH 158-59,
195, 207-11 (1982).
23. See Gabel and Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory
and the Practice of Law, 11. N.Y.U. REV. OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE 369 (1982).
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that the beneficent purposes of government will be better served with-
out procedures and the claim that the beneficent purposes of no gov-
ernment will be better served without procedures. In one case the
judge plays God, and in the other, the lawyer does.
Besides making idols of our procedures on the one hand and do-
ing away with them on the other, there is a third way of belying our
creatureliness in the realm of procedure. That is to lose respect for
the fellow creatures with whom we deal. If we deploy procedures that
demean the participants, as many welfare agencies do; if we deploy
procedures that the participants cannot understand (try explaining
the defendant's interrogatories to a member of the plaintiff class in a
civil rights class action); if we let an accused rapist who claims he is
innocent plead guilty of simple assault because the prosecutor and the
public defender are both too busy to go to trial; if our procedures are
so slow that a personal injury claimant has to settle for half what his
case is worth or starve waiting for his trial date-if any of these things
happen-and God knows they all do-we are failing to recognize
God's creature and our own fellow creature in the person with whom
we deal.
It remains for us to see how these reflections apply to the individ-
ual lawyer settling down with a form book and a yellow pad to decide
what moves to lay next on the other side. Lawyers with a flair for
procedure can use their professional skills in more ways than one.
They can work for a clear, swift and succinct presentation of the mer-
its of both parties' claims, followed by a thoughtful and well-informed
decision. Or they can work for trivialization, harassment, confusion,
obfuscation, and delay, hoping to wear the other party out or run his
legal fees so high it is not worthwhile to continue. The reflection that
it is God's business that is supposed to be getting done in our all too
human tribunals may be of some help in deciding which way to go.
But our full cooperation in the process depends on some assur-
ance of the possibility of God's business in fact getting done. This
means that the substantive law that is going to be applied must meet
reasonable standards of justice, that the tribunal must have reasonable
integrity, that the procedures must be reasonably calculated to yield a
decision on the merits, and that they must be comprehensible and
affordable. If these conditions are met, then I think it is our responsi-
bility to use our procedures as they are meant to be used, that is, to
develop the merits as clearly as possible for an expeditious decision.
But to the extent that these conditions are not fulfilled, our duty
becomes more ambiguous. Where the system turns aside from its di-
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vinely ordered purpose, we may have occasion to go with the purpose
and let the system take care of itself. What pro bono lawyer, despair-
ing of the sad state of one or another branch of the substantive law
affecting the poor, has not gone back to his depositions and interroga-
tories with renewed vigor after reflecting on the number of two hun-
dred fifty dollar hours his adversary's lawyer will have to spend
answering them? And can we blame him?
The ethical questions in procedure are for the most part familiar.
Is it acceptable to use discovery to delay an opponent's case or to run
up the clock? Is it acceptable to deny an allegation you know is true
but think your opponent cannot prove? Is it acceptable to object to
evidence that is relevant and persuasive, but disqualified because by
some technical rule? Is it acceptable to claim a jury trial because you
think a jury will be: more impressed by your opponent's balance sheet
than by the judge's instructions? Is it acceptable to gain forensic ad-
vantages from the failure of your opponent to prepare for a pretrial
conference? Is it acceptable to show disrespect for a judge who seems
to be biased against you (I am thinking of a scene of Paul Newman's
in The Verdict)?
It seems to me: that what most characterizes a religious approach
to procedure is to have no ready made universal answer to these ques-
tions.24 It is God's, purpose to manifest His justice in the world, and
each one of us is called, just as the whole system is called, to carry out
that purpose on His behalf. In doing so, we must both support the
system and supplement it. We must recognize and allow for its fail-
ings without exacerbating them. If the wheels of justice grind badly,
we may want to do a little supplementary grinding on the side. But
we are not to give up on them, because God has set them up. If a
particular judge or tribunal is acting illegitimately, we may have occa-
sion for some delegitimizing work. But we cannot delegitimize the
whole system, because God has made it legitimate.
24. I believe Mr. Lohn is quite mistaken when he says in his thoughtful response to my
paper that the real world gives no scope for discretion in answering these questions. I think it
would be a rare case in which a conscientious lawyer would be either disciplined or held liable
for malpractice for answering any of them one way or the other.
